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Panel III: The Privacy Debate: To
What Extent Should Traditionally "Pri-
vate" Communications Remain Private
on the Internet?
Moderator: Joel Reidenberg, Esq.a
Panelists: Norman I. Silber, Esq.b
Peter Drew Kennedy, Esq.c
Ronald Abramson, Esq.d
PROF. REIDENBERG: Our topic this afternoon is whether
traditionally private communications should remain private when
they are on the Internet. This topic raises a variety of themes and
we will try to touch on many of them.
Part of our inquiry will examine what the technology is doing
and will explore the challenges that the technology poses to us for
private communications.
When we look at the technology and the Internet in particular,
we see new problems and new issues being raised. How do we use
it? If I post a message to something called a Usenet Group or if
I simply send a "point to point" e-mail message, it may have radi-
cally different consequences for both who can access it, and what
else can happen to that message.
The act of sending a message now generates information, gen-
a. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY;
Dartmouth College, A.B., 1983; Columbia University, J.D., 1986; Universit6 de Paris I
Panth6on-Sorbonne, D.E.A.
b. Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; Washing-
ton University, B.A., 1972; Yale Graduate School of History, Ph.D., 1978; Columbia
University, J.D., 1986.
c. Senior Associate, George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P., Austin, Tx; Southwestern
University, B.A., 1985; University of Chicago, J.D., 1988.
d. Partner, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, New York, NY; Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, B.S., 1970; Rutgers University School of Law, J.D., 1976 (with high honors).
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erates details about what I do. If we engage in interactive com-
munications and use multimedia activities, like watching a movie
in the privacy of the home, these activities may no longer be pri-
vate. Now it is possible for others to know what I am watching,
or whether I am paying attention to the commercials. Marketers
want to know, for instance, if I zap the commercials. Do I prefer
beer commercials or do I like the cereal commercials? All of this
information has now become accessible through various technologi-
cal means.
The kinds of issues that we are going to discuss this afternoon
can be cast in four different dimensions. The first one, which Pro-
fessor Silber will lead, is the consumer view. As consumers in
society, how does the technology and the marketplace of the tech-
nology affect us and how does it affect what we perceive as pri-
vate?
We will then think about the content of communications. Who
has access to what I say or how I say it? Peter Drew Kennedy will
discuss this topic, and I will introduce it in more detail when it
comes up, but the general issue is how people are protected when
they are engaged in communications by means of information tech-
nologies.
This also raises issues of cryptography-whether there are self-
help mechanisms in addition to legal ones-which Ron Abramson
will address. We will also be confronting other related questions,
such as whether transaction information is private, and if it is, who
owns it. Still other questions are raised through the merger be-
tween ownership issues and privacy issues-if I gather the informa-
tion, can I use it any way I want? We think of these rights as
property. Yet, how I use the information may implicate rights that
concern individuals.
Finally, I hope that we will touch on questions of the roles of
the state and the private sector. How do we set up a regulatory
framework? What is the proper role of the state? Should self-
regulation prevail? Do we focus on letting the network figure it
out for itself? Or should the state be stepping in?
With that I would like to introduce Professor Silber. He is a
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professor at Hofstra Law School. He holds his law degree from
Columbia University, his Ph.D in history from Yale, and is a grad-
uate of the Washington University in St. Louis. Norm, I think,
also holds the distinction of being one of the most thoughtful and
nicest members of my law school class. So, with that, I will intro-
duce Professor Silber.
PROF. SILBER: Thank you very much. I must preface my
talk by saying that when it comes to the world of the Internet, I am
an amateur explorer. I don't want to hold myself out in as an
expert. I do claim some experience, however, in the area of con-
sumer regulation and consumer reform.
When I was asked to appear on this panel, the invitation pro-
vided me with the opportunity to address some of the problems that
consumers are encountering and are likely to encounter in the fu-
ture as a result of the transformation in the way in which business
is being done. And increasingly, as I will indicate, business is
being done on the Internet. I am grateful to the editors of this
Journal for the opportunity to present my views.
The conventional ways of consuming-going to the store or
shopping by catalogue-are being supplemented with newer ones.
These involve buying over the telephone, through the television,
and now buying over the Internet. There is a new marketplace,
cyberspace, and a new way of merchandising-telemarketing.
Predictions have been made that by 1998 there will be a communi-
ty of fifty million commercial users communicating with one an-
other, and fifty million electronic clients and customers on the
streets of the Internet, if by that time the "information highway" is
still the appropriate 'metaphor to use.'
There are many important effects of this change on consumers.
I want to focus on two that I feel are among the most important.
I will refer to these as the "New Media" effect and the "New Mar-
keting" effect. Then I will consider several possible legal respons-
es to these effects. I am going to argue that the traditional con-
1. Richard Cross, Internet, The Missing Marketing Medium Found, DIR. MKT. MAG.,
Oct. 1994, at 20.
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sumer law enforcement paradigms for confronting ordinary con-
sumer problems hold the most promise for improving conditions
for consumer users on the electronic superhighway. And along the
way I am going to challenge the view that we can expect much
from the privacy paradigm, which I gather has really been an un-
derlying premise of this Symposium.
The first effect, the New Media Effect, has occurred virtually
every time consumers have confronted an old selling scheme
through a new medium. This effect is especially pronounced when,
as in these circumstances, new selling techniques are associated
with a whole new kinds of technology.
This happened; for example, during medieval fairs when con-
sumers had trouble figuring out the quality of the cloth that they
were buying because it was wrapped up in bolts. It happened dur-
ing the French Revolution when consumers had to take their chanc-
es on bottled wine. It happened again in the 19th Century when
brand-name advertising came into being.2
In his oral history of the great depression, Hard Times, Studs
Terkel has revealed how valuable radio advertising space became
after radios became commonplace during the 1920s and '30s.
Consumers were accustomed to advertisements in newspapers and
to pitches from sales people, but they had never before heard radio
appeals. It took time for consumers to adjust to the particular
problems of exaggerated claims and misrepresentations. Historical-
ly, every time a new medium for selling arises, consumers have
trouble measuring the truthfulness of sellers who use the new medi-
um.
There is money to be made exploiting those who are slow to
catch on, and the law also plays catch-up with respect to outlawing
inappropriate conduct and enforcing rules that have been made. To
persist with my example, the Federal Trade Commission didn't try
to prosecute fraudulent radio ads until after World War 11.
4
2. See NORMAN SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST (1983).
3. See STUDS TERKEL, HARD TIMES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
60-65 (1970) (interview of William Benton).
4. Id. See also Eric Freedman, The Inside-Out Approach to First Amendment Juris-
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Today, by all accounts, consumer fraud on the Internet is ram-
pant. Most of it consists of the classical, tried and true, scam vari-
eties. Some of it is novel. Many of the victims are well educated
and intelligent people, bright enough and prosperous enough to buy
and to operate personal computers. Others are poor, young and
uneducated.
Consider briefly four types of fraud that have regularly surfaced
on "the Net":
1. Ponzi Schemes.5 Within the last several months, New Jersey
regulators stopped an electronic mail chain letter in which pros-
pects were encouraged to send one dollar each to the top five
names on the list and they were supposed to place their name at
the bottom and sit back and wait for sixty thousand dollars to roll
in.6 That is a classic variation of an old pyramid selling scheme
that goes all the way back to the 1920s and '30s.
2. Stock manipulation. The instantaneous communication of-
fered by computers has made some scams, such as stock manipula-
tion, far easier to pull off than ever before. Securities regulators
in several states have been trying to halt Internet scams, varying
from those which get consumers to commit money to phony money
management companies, to those involving the hyping of worthless
penny stocks.7 It is very common now, and very easy. You can
simply encourage people to buy these penny stocks and then sell
the stock that you had bought earlier at a very high price.
Estimated losses are one million dollars an hour nationwide.8
Unfortunately, at present, a major target for this scam is generally
the elderly.
prudence (forthcoming).
5. Charlotte-Anne Lucas, Hoods Hit the Highway, DALLAS ,MORNING NEWS, July 1,
1994, at DI.
6. David Flaum, Don't Get Rooked by Computer Online Crooks, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
24, 1994, at C3.
7. Id.
8. Lynn Simross, The Goods, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at E3. A regular "boiler
room" scam operation can make one hundred and fifty calls on a good day, whereas com-
puter bulletin boards can contact thousands of people a day. Id.
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3. Phony merchandise and property scams. "It's scam de
jour,"9 one law enforcement officer has stated. "Whether it's some-
one who poses as a celebrity or who deliberately spreads false
rumors, fraud is rampant in cyberspace."'
Commercial services like America OnLine, CompuServe,
Delphi and the Well have released a host of novices on to the elec-
tronic bulletin boards and into the electronic realm. One reporter
has stated that, "[flor this new wave of curious explorers, technol-
ogy has become an authority figure that isn't questioned ....
You're looking at a computer screen and you forget that you're
actually dealing with other people, not some omnipotent being."'"
Millions of dollars have been lost by Internet newcomers to
experts in fraud who purport to sell everything from time-shares to
cubic zirconium. The targets of this fraud, for the most part, are
people who are new to the medium, and there is the problem of
fraud against vulnerable groups, particularly the elderly, but I sus-
pect children as well.' 2
4. Impersonations. Another common scam is impersonations.
Thousands of e-mail messages are intentionally being misattributed.
Here is a story from the Los Angeles Times:
"You pop on to your America Online account, check your
e-[m]ail and find a note from Keanu." The message details
how he loves motorcycles, misses River Phoenix and enjoys
playing bass in a band called Dogstar. You pull up
Keanu's on-line biography-something every AOL member
fills out when signing up with the service-and the name
listed is KReeves. Even the birthday shown-Sept. 2,
1964-matches the actor's. So, it's got to be legitimate,
right? Wrong. On line you can be anyone, with any age
and background, and some enjoy fooling others by posing
as celebrities. On America Online, three subscribers are
posing as U2 singer Bono and four as Keanu Reeves. The
9. L.A. Lorek, Fraud Entering Cyberspace, SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 1994, at G1.
10. P.J. Huffstutter, Beware of Wanna-be@Fake.Com, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994,
(Calendar), at 101.
11. Id.
12. Simross, supra note 8, at E3.
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Times sent e-mail notes to the four Reeves wanna-bees, ask-
ing "Are you the Keanu Reeves star of the film 'Speed"'?
Three responded with a yes. One using the handle "Keanu"
wrote back that he "picked up on lotsa chicks this way."
The real Reeves has never gone on line. In a statement, the
actor said he is "appalled" and will "explore any and all
legal action" to halt this misrepresentation. 3
You could argue that this kind of behavior is defamation, and that
the other swindles that I have talked about are other varieties of
commercial fraud. But how do victims find the parties who are
doing the defrauding?
Although these techniques are for the most part time-honored
fraudulent schemes, the standard investigative approaches are prov-
ing to be ineffective, and the currently necessary evidentiary proofs
are hard to come by. 4 For the most part, a person sending infor-
mation on the Internet can determine what the receiver, or anyone
who intercepts the message, will see as the "from" address. 5 This
includes not giving any return address at all.
Shouldn't the Internet service providers bear responsibility for
permitting these frauds to operate freely? Why aren't membership
applications being verified and accurate addresses aggressively
insisted upon? Shouldn't those who facilitate the sending of false
and misleading messages, especially commercial ones over the
network, be punished?.
America Online places the responsibility for misrepresentation
squarely with its subscribers. "They agree not to submit or display
13. See Hufstutter, supra note 10.
14. See e.g., Michael P. Dierks, Computer Network Abuse, in Symposium: Electronic
Communications and Legal Change, 6 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 307, 315 (1993). Dierks de-
scribes an example of one person, Kevin Mitnick, who circumvented computer security,
causing $4 million in damage to the Massachusetts-based Digital Equipment Corporation
through his Los Angeles-based computer. He devised a method of escaping telephone
tracing through the use of the call-forwarding service of the telephone company and was
able to evade law enforcement officials by re-routing traces on his telephone to any other
number of his choosing. Id. at 315-16.
15. John Markoff, Cyberburglars are Using New Methods, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 23,
1995 (Business), at 5.
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any inaccurate information," a spokesperson stated.1 6 "If a false-
hood is brought to our attention, then we'll try to deal with it. But
we've got more than a million subscribers now. It's impossible for
us to track every user. It's up to people on the service to police
themselves." 7
Is this the right outcome? Shouldn't we shift the loss allocation
rules a bit to encourage more attention to these problems by the
service providers?
The second major effect of cyberspace on consumers that I
want to talk about has resulted not directly from the new salesman-
ship on computer, but instead it has resulted indirectly, from the
use that sellers and marketers in and out of cyberspace can make
by sifting through communications and transactions that take place
on the Internet.
The sophistication of the marketing has increased to the point
at which successful salesmanship and consumption engineering
depends on building models of consumer behavior. These models,
in turn, depend on capturing information about consumers that is
as accurate and as detailed as possible.
The author of the book Doing Business on the Internet states
that by following the discussions that occur in user groups it is
possible to reveal quickly which groups are a good match for a
particular company. 8 Another commentator notes that, "even with-
out posting a message, companies will learn a lot about the norms
and culture of the network by monitoring a number of groups."' 9
There are two ways that the Internet facilitates the capture of
marketing information. First, there is the use of the Internet to get
into computer databases in order to obtain information. The types
of information that can be acquired through an Internet computer
connection from databases and lists over ordinary phone lines are
16. See Huffstutter, supra, note 10.
17. Id. (quoting America Online spokeswoman Pam McGraw).
18. MARY J. CRONIN, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET: How THE ELECTRONIC
HIGHWAY IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN COMPANIES (1994).
19. See Cross, supra note 1.
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quite astonishing. 20  Most of the information gathered by the pri-
vate sector remains unregulated, and most efforts to regulate it that
exist are voluntary.2z
Ironically, if you want to avoid inadvertently revealing facts
about yourself, it appears that what you have to do is to falsify
your name to a service provider, thereby giving a false name and
address to marketers.
It should be kept in mind that the Internet is only part of what
is becoming a national information infrastructure which will be a
web of databases and computer networks. Screening data, sorting
it and combining it into lists for solicitations is greatly facilitated
by the infrastructure. As we speak, people are sitting at their PCs
and Macs and doing aggregation of data and amalgamation of data
and acquiring a lot of information.22
Jeffrey Rothfelder, an author and reporter for Business Week,
managed to get such information as Dan Rather's credit card data
and his home loan mortgage information, and Dan Quayle's private
address and his clothing habits.23 One wonders what for, but that
is another question.
In most cases the information that is obtained is used to identi-
fy potential customers who fit a prescribed marketing profile.
Marketers are always looking for new card members, buyers for
catalogues, and members for their organizations. But so far there
20. John Markoff, A Most Wanted Cyberthief is Caught in His Own Web, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at Al. Individual "hackers," furthermore, have the capability to
capture and store information that formerly was exercised only by large institutions. Id..
The databases are everywhere, guarded with widely varying degrees of effectiveness. Id.
21. See Kinsey Wilson, On the Information Superhighway, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1993,
(City), at 46.
22. Judith Waldrop, The Business of Privacy, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1994, at 46.
Also known in the direct mail industry as "merge and purge," these aggregation methods
encompass techniques where information gatherers combine lists and sort them based on
assumptions made, such as a person's wealth, a zip code, or personal lifestyle indicators.
Id.
23. JEFFREY ROTHFELDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE 17-18 (1992). In most cases, howev-
er, the information that is obtained is used to identify potential customers who fit a
prescribed marketing profile. It helps to direct catalogs and products to the people who
want them. So far, there aren't any rules attached to individuals. Id. at 17.
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aren't any rules attached to rummaging around.
The second way that cyberspace is affecting consumer market-
ing is the use by the Internet service providers of their privileged
places, alongside the information highway, to collect data them-
selves.24 Capturing information on the Internet allows sellers to
focus their activities on those that will be most profitable for them
and to reject transactions with consumers who might lose them
money or cause them trouble.
The services require consumers to execute blanket releases
which permit the trading and collection of data to go on as a matter
of routine. Let me quote from a standard form contract that sub-
scribers to the Internet service Delphi are asked to sign:
Unless you instruct us otherwise for any reason, on occa-
sion we may arrange with third parties to provide you with
information and materials we believe you would enjoy re-
ceiving based on your demonstrated interests. Use of the
information you provide Delphi Intemet may be used for
internal, external or commercial purposes, and may involve
disclosure of the information to commercial and/or govern-
mental entities.2 5
24. Not only service providers but software manufacturers can collect data. For
example, Microsoft Corporation's "Windows 95" software will contain a "registration
wizard" feature that would allow the corporation to inventory hardware components and
software programs already installed in the user's computer. See, Technology: On Line,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at D3.,
25. Membership Agreement, Delphi Internet Services Corporation, received Feb. 9,
1995. The agreement also provides that:
6. You authorize Delphi Internet to apply all incurred fees to your credit card.
You agree to be fully responsible for such charges. A credit limit, established
by Delphi Internet and by the issuer of your credit card may be applied.to your
account. Delphi Internet reserves the right to suspend your access to the service
if you exceed your credit limit, or upon an indication of credit problems includ-
ing delinquent payments or rejection of any credit card charges.
Id. In addition, the Agreement outlines numerous other rules and limitations. The section
on "Rules of Online Behavior" prohibits members from posting any "unlawful, libelous,
threatening, abusive, disruptive, or obscene material or message that would violate the
rights of any person or constitute a criminal offense, or otherwise violate any local, state,
national, or international law." Id. Use of distribution lists in electronic mailings is "sub-
ject to the approval of Delphi Internet," and members are "prohibited from uploading or
reproducing any information protected by copyright without obtaining permission of the
[Vol. 5:329
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If I were teaching my course in consumer law I would ask, isn't
that a classic example of great psychological framing? Haven't we
framed the question in a way that makes it very unlikely for a
consumer to object to having his information used in that way? In
other words, the response to this contract language might be very
different if it stated something like, "Delphi can do what it wants
with whatever you send over the Internet, and can trade your name
with third parties unless you negotiate different terms."
It is also true where the "learming curve" associated with adjust-
ing to a new service provider is steep. Consider the case of an
insurance company that uses your health bills and your insurance
claim forms to screen offers for further insurance. If people think
that their relationship is with their HMO, they have no expectation
that their information is going to be distributed to others, and the
waiver allowing their information to be distributed is not often
framed in a way which could alert them to such a potential use.
Technically, I think that most consumers don't know that offensive
use is part of the bargain, and if they did know, they would change
that term.
The potential injury to consumers from the conveyance of
rights to this information to others can be, and frequently is, severe.
Let me mention a few different categories of injury with which
many of you may be familiar. The first is impermissible discrimi-
nation. Of great concern is the possibility that this technology can
be used illegally or covertly to screen people for jobs, mortgages,
insurance or other opportunities. Do you want to know how often
somebody has been to the doctor? Do you want to know how
often they have been to a motel room? Do you want to know if a
caller who wants to rent from you lives in an affluent community
or in low income housing?
Some discrimination is lawful but none the less questionable as
a matter of social policy. To improve its own risk, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company is now screening individuals at risk for
heart disease by scanning HMO claims for diagnosis codes that
copyright owner." Id.
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identify people who have hypertension or high levels of cholester-
ol. 26 They send them a letter and a booklet advising them of the
importance of managing their disease. 27 An employer might simi-
larly try to avoid hiring heart-attack-prone employees. Perhaps an
insurer can "cherry pick" by learning who buys steaks at the super-
market, or AIDS medications at a drug store.
The second area of potential injury is where the conveyance of
information results in factual mistakes about the consumer. The
possibility is always present that incorrect or "misaligned" consum-
er information is going to be used against the consumer. A market
information provider may combine information incorrectly, or in
some cases, the combination may produce results that are not con-
sistent. It may be that the information is sufficiently accurate for
the marketer to want them, but insufficiently accurate for a con-
sumer to be satisfied with the conclusions that are drawn.
A third area of potential harm is offensive communications:
neo-Nazi groups spreading literature to Holocaust victims, anti-
abortionists getting hold of Planned Parenthood lists, etc. Oral
Roberts acquired a list of deadbeats from an agency and he sent
them each a letter, asking them to turn around their lives by send-
ing him a gift of one hundred dollars. He then promised to inter-
cede with God on their behalf and begin what he said was the "war
on [your] debt., 28
26. See Waldrop, supra. note 22, at 46.
27. Id.
28. Id. As Waldrop points out, however, the mail marketers themselves realize that
there is a problem. Consider, for example, the following statement:
Suppose somebody wants to buy information from American Express so they
can send hate mail to the Mormons. Is there a point in the organization where
the decision to sell is subjected to scrutiny? A lot of thought has to go into
what you collect .... We avoid as many sensitive areas as possible. That's
why Buyer's Choice initially decided to stay out of fund-raising-it's controver-
sial. But then fund-raising people started asking me to put these topics on...
• When both sides wanted these topics included, we finally added questions on
some charities to our survey.... [But we, like] most direct mailers place decoy
names on every file they rent. It's called a "seeding" in the industry. It en-
sures that a client won't show us one letter and mail another. That's how we
can avoid the people who send hate mail to Mormons.
Id. (quoting a Buyer's Choice Executive).
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Another problem is increased information search time. There
is the problem of receiving ordinary commercial solicitations that
are unwanted. Consumers have no control over the prospecting
efforts that produce the bulk of mail they receive,29 and they are
forced to sort through the mail. If you could see my dining room
table sometimes, you might shudder. My dining room table be-
comes full of clutter and a lot of it is the result of this kind of
aggregation and "merging and purging," as they call it. The impact
in individual cases is trivial, but the net effect on my ability to
make informed choices may not be.
Yet another problem consists of nonconsensual government
disclosure. The problem is that unregulated access to information
which consumers have provided to obtain benefits from the govern-
ment allows users to obtain these consumer's names. You can buy
a whole file of benefit data or driver's license data and get all that
information about people, including their height, weight and eye
color. This type of information is in the public record and some
states choose to sell it.30  At the current time, some people are
being targeted for weight loss programs if their weight is dispro-
portionate to their height.31
In 1989, there was a famous episode in which the TV actress
Rebecca Schaeffer was killed by a man who obtained her home ad-
dress through the California Motor Vehicle records.32
There are several alternative proposals for ameliorating the
problems I have discussed. I suppose that the easiest and most per-
suasive, as far as many are concerned, is simply to do nothing and
let the problems fade away. As we are reminded by some of the
newer schools of legal analysis, we are wrong if we think that the
only law enforcement mechanisms are in the hands of the govern-
29. Id.
30. Id. Additionally, without even knowing their name, people may be able to obtain
a person's address. Or, suppose that someone runs you off the road. If you run their
plate through the system, you can get their name and driver's license number, which in
26 states is their social security number. There is much that can be done with someone's
personal information, including getting a credit card in their name. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Rothfelder, supra note 23, at 14-15.
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ment. After all, there are other kinds of ways in which customs
and practices are formed.
There are social forces which can be applied to discourage
antisocial behavior on the Internet. I am told that in the electronic
mail community, there is a lot of informal disapprobation that goes
on. In other words, you can be the subject of a lot of "bad mouth-
ing," if, indeed, you behave in a manner that is irresponsible.
Then there is also the more forceful way, the unplugging of
Internet offenders by private agreement or by community vote.
You can unplug an offender vertically if you have what is called
a host-based system, and you can control the offender's access; or
horizontally, if you control a network and are displeased with the
conduct of a system, by denying interconnection to a network.33
So, in either case, there are these informal social mechanisms
and agreement-based systems of control. Will self-regulation or
reliance upon these "social forces" be sufficient?
The market-oriented argument against the regulation of the sale
of information is that the problems of privacy and abuse on the
Internet are self-correcting. This theory posits that the industry, in
its desire to attract customers and avoid governmental regulation,
is going to develop industry-wide standards to protect the profits
that are being generated from this new technology.
If there is an abundance of fraud and a lack of privacy on the
information superhighway, the argument is that consumers are not
going to be willing to get on to it. It is going to cost money, it is
new, many people are not comfortable with the technology, and if,
in addition, it turns out that the information is going to be misused,
people will refuse to get on it. Therefore, this argument goes, the
industry will eventually be forced to police itself in order to en-
courage consumer use.
Apart from the willingness to tolerate what I would call
distributional effects that are in all likelihood inequitable, this argu-
ment is to me more than a little bit hypothetical and long-run in its
33. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure
of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1231 (1992).
[Vol. 5:329
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON THE PRIVACY DEBATE
expectations of success. It presumes that consumers have the nec-
essary information about the problems that they are going to en-
counter and, accordingly, can make an informed choice at the time
they do the contracting. It also presumes that even if consumers
had the resources with which to make an informed choice to con-
tract with a service provider, there wouldn't be a much larger so-
cial benefit to baselining standards within the entire industry. Fi-
nally, it also presumes that the industry is not more interested in
the appearance of providing protection than in protection itself.
Consumer experiences in other related industries are not partic-
ularly comforting in this regard. At the recent 1994 meeting of the
Direct Marketers Association, one analyst reported that fifty percent
of the catalogers don't give their customers a convenient way to
remove their names from a company list, which "does not bode
well for the industry's claims of effective self-regulation. 34
Even if all of the association's members complied with guide-
lines, there is no guarantee that the information brokers who pro-
vide this information and who provide the list are going to abide
by the same' standards. It appears that industry self-regulation
provides inadequate protection for consumers, even when public
and political attention is actually focused on the problem, let alone
when it is not.
Another approach that we might consider is widely acceptable,
and that is to increase the burden on consumers to look out for
themselves. This attitude reminds me very much of a study I did
about auto safety.35 When the automobile industry was young, the
primary focus of preventing accidents (and there were a lot of
accidents when the auto industry was young) was on what the wags
began to call "the nut behind the steering wheel. 36 The "nut"
behind the steering wheel was usually the driver, who was sup-
posed to be responsible for these accidents.
Today on the Internet we have a similar situation that is devel-
34. See Waldrop, supra note 22.
35. See SILBER, supra note 2, at 75.
36. Id. at 80; see also RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN
DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 232-33 (1965).
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oping with respect to consumers. In magazines and in newspapers
we see lots of literature about what consumers can do to protect
themselves. It also reminds me of the campaign for self-protection
on the New York city subway-you know, you see signs like,
"Watch your wallet!" as if that is the best response for you and the
subway system to take to prevent pickpockets.
Well, in a similar fashion, consumers are being told that they
can "adopt certain strategies to safeguard both their informational
privacy and their right to be let alone. 37  To avoid calls from
telemarketers, consumers can use answering machines to screen
their calls, or to prevent information from being gathered through
credit cards, consumers can always use cash if they want. Howev-
er, most consumers would agree that these are not satisfactory
responses: answering machines eventually have to get listened to,
and carrying cash can be inconvenient and dangerous. Of course,
consumers who don't want the risk on the Internet can just get out
altogether, but it is becoming more and more important and more
and more necessary for all of us to use the Internet as a market-
place.
The service providers, I believe, take advantage of their bar-
gaining power to shift burdens to their consumer members. A stan-
dard form agreement used by Delphi, for example, in its section on
"representations, warranties and acknowledgements," requires that
the consumer guarantee that none of the rights of others are going
to be violated.38 Furthermore, the agreement informs consumers
that "by submitting information or materials owned by you for
publication or posting on, or distribution through Delphi Internet,
you will be deemed to have granted Delphi Internet non-exclusive
permission to redistribute by transmission the information or mate-
rials worldwide without charge or liability. 39
A member agrees not to "hold, seek to hold, Delphi Internet
37. Ellen R. Foxman and Paula Kilcoyne, Information Technology, Marketing Prac-
tice, and Consumer Privacy: Ethical Issues, J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MKTG., Spr. 1993, at
106.
38. See Delphi Membership Agreement, supra note 25.
39. Id.; see also Michael Noer, Policing Cyperspace, FORBES, Apr. 10, 1995, at 50.
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liable for loss of data or misappropriation or infringement of any
intellectual property right to which [the member] claim[s] owner-
ship."'4 By shifting liability to consumers, the Internet service
providers avoid spending time or money to police their networks
to minimize consumer fraud. The Delphi Internet membership
agreement provides that members are entirely responsible for com-
mercial services that they enter over the Internet. Here I will quote
again from the Delphi agreement:
If ordering merchandise and/or services from anyone other
than Delphi Internet, through any commercial services
available, all transaction terms, including but not limited to
purchase terms, payment terms, warranties, guarantees,
maintenance and delivery are solely between you and the
seller of the merchandise services. Delphi makes no war-
ranties or representations whatsoever with regard to any
goods or services provided by the seller of the merchandise
or services and shall not be liable for the costs or damages
arising either directly or indirectly from the products or
services or from the actions or inactions of the seller.4'
As a result of the structure of the Internet, with its interlocking
networks and agreements such as the one that I have just quoted,
I believe that the Internet has accurately been called "the closest
thing to anarchy that has ever existed.
' 42
I am not expert in the area of First Amendment law or privacy
law; however, I believe that most of the efforts to reinvigorate
privacy law so as to solve these problems will prove ill-fated. That
is'to say that the proper legal paradigm for promoting effective
regulation of the Internet's intrusiveness with respect to merchan-
dising is not to resort to the privacy paradigms that are being de-
bated in this Symposium.
40. Delphi Membership Agreement, supra note 25. The university or the corporation
setting up the LAN or cluster of LANs is both the legislator and enforcer of rules on the
Internet, but the boundaries between LANs blur as the communities intersect. Id.
41. Id.
42. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994, at
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The central problem with the privacy paradigms is that "[t]he
computers that process personal data for the information society.
. are located outside the individual space that is traditionally pro-
tected as private. 43 Once computers record information about a
person, this data can no longer be considered part of the private
preserve of the data subject.'
The creation of records that detail one's existence and way of
life is a permanent condition of our society and, unfortunately, the
privacy doctrines have not done much to serve that interest.45 Be-
cause the computer allows most of the innocuous information to be
used in ways that are highly offensive to many individuals, both
non-sensitive and sensitive data is going be inappropriately protect-
ed by privacy law.
And privacy analysis doesn't help determine how the law
should permit personal data to be collected, processed, and used by
others. As interpreted by the Court, the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects only those subjective expectations of privacy that the society
is willing to accept as reasonable.46 Once society diminishes the
expectations of reasonableness, as it has done in cyberspace, the
Court has generally not been willing to restrict incursions into the
private sphere.4 7 Even if the Court were to do that, its methodolo-
gy which defines privacy in terms of physical area48 and informa-
tion within that physical area, would still leave the Court to re-
spond inadequately to consumer problems with respect to the com-
puter.
What I would like to recommend is that we consider returning
to the kind of analysis, statutory reform, and administrative en-
43. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1346.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1347.
46. Id. at 1345 (referring to California Bankers' Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 89
(1974)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. Schwartz, supra note33, at 1345 n.32.
48. Id. at 1323 n.3. The professed goal of French data protection, for example, is
to place "infomatics at the service of each citizen, insure its development within a context
of international cooperation, and prevent it from damaging human identity, human rights,
private life, individual rights, or private rights." Id. (citing Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 177-82 (1984)).
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forcement efforts that have been favored when consumers have
challenged fraud and misrepresentation and oppressive contracts of
adhesion in many other contexts. 49
In a classically competitive free market, consumers exercise
power by electing one provider or another according to their wishes
and differences in the type of services available. 50 But real mar-
kets, including, as we have seen, those on the Internet, are imper-
fect. Despite the number of those who are joining the Internet, the
markets for selecting particular vendors and for selecting the priva-
cy that you want are far from perfect. There are, no doubt, signifi-
cant transaction costs in terms of time and money spent associated
with searching for and changing to an alternative service provider.
There is no significant negotiation that takes place with retail
consumers over the standard form contracts that contain the terms
that I have talked about so far. Competition to provide higher
degrees of privacy may be considerable when the buyers are banks
or corporations, but not when they are most other folks. Further-
more, in a market environment, the transaction costs of finding a
vendor that gives you more privacy or more protection from fraud
may exceed the costs that are associated with either enforcing the
laws against your current provider or switching over. This is par-
ticularly true when a network user "makes a significant investment
in network specific software or hardware, in other words, when
there is significant detrimental reliance on the network's service
terms."' '
I think that relational theories of contract-those which recog-
nize the disparity in information and bargaining power between the
parties, and which have provided a foundation for many consumer
protection statutes and uniform laws and court-made laws in the
past-offer a justification for relaxing the traditional contract law
in coping with the realities of network communities. For example,
there is a problem of network intermediaries who don't have a
49. See, e.g., MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACIONS (1992 ed.).
50. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities, 38
VILL. L. REV. 349, 350 (1993).
51. Id. at 357.
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relationship to the originator, the person who signed the contract.
Well, it seems to me that addressing this problem relates very
much to the problem of privity in a conventional contract form, and
that a rather straight-forward approach to the problem would be to
strengthen the cause of action that people would have by relaxing
a privity requirement.
With respect to fraud, the time-worn elements are still the
same. The necessity is to educate consumers about the problem
and to use legal rules to strengthen the rights of consumers to take
actions against: (1) those who send them solicitations; (2) the
vendors who provide sellers with the lists; (3) the list vendor's
sources; and (4) the Internet service providers.
Through Federal or State consumer protection laws, various
minimum standards directed to establishing minimal rights need to
be grafted into the law. I have two which I will briefly suggest.
One standard would be to create strict rules for consumer opt-outs
and waivers, including opt-outs from Internet subscriber lists.
Delphi, CompuServe, America Online and others allow subscribers
to choose whether or not to be on mailing lists sold by them. This
takes place after the consumer signs up and periodically thereafter.
It is arguable that if consumers have signed up and have taken part
in the service, and if once a year they have received the opportuni-
ty to opt-out but they haven't opted-out of such a list, then they
have accepted the consequence of being on such a list.52
The problem, from my point of view, however, is in the fram-
ing of the choices that the consumers are presented with: the de-
ceptions, the limitations, and the unequal bargaining power.53 This
problem can be addressed by adopting significant and sensitive
consumer rules in this regard.
The fact that consumers want more choice in opting-out is clear
52. See Waldrop, supra note 22. American Express, for example, is proud of the fact
that they allow customers to opt out of lists. Id. It has a privacy council that meets regu-
larly and reviews company policies. Id. Every employee who gathers consumer informa-
tion sits down and tells exactly what they have. Id.
53. See Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology,
Consumer Behavior and Consumer Law, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 69 (1990).
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from looking at surveys that have been done by the Direct Market-
ing Association. Already some 2.9 million people have opted out
of direct marketing offers.54 But such systems of universal opting
out often eliminate categories that the consumer might want. What
most consumers really mean when they do or don't opt out is that
there are certain things that they want and certain things that they
don't want. I agree with those who have developed "categorical"
opt-outs which allow people to suppress certain categories of
mail."
There is a group called Buyers Choice, which is a Division of
Equifax, that collects data on the categories of mail that people
want and don't want. Out of one hundred categories, the average
consumer is said to want only about forty. 6 California is now the
first state to actually require that credit card customers have the
opportunity to get off of lists.57 If the lists are sold, the California
cardholder has to be given "clear and conspicuous notice," includ-
ing a mailing address or a toll-free number for easy opt-out.58
The second proposal that I- would make for a minimum privacy
standard is to restrict the ability of list purchasers to buy "sensi-
tive" information about consumers over the Internet. In the United
States there is no such thing as sensitive information except as
people choose to define it themselves. Even the Standard Rate and
Data Service mailing list catalogue, which is a standard industry
tool, includes lists that reflect such sensitive information as sexual
preference, religion, medical information and political contributions.
But, according to list industry professionals, "you do have to sepa-
54. See Wilson, supra note 21.
55. Waldrop, supra note 22.
56. Id.
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1748.12 (West 1994).
58. See id.; see also Kenneth Howe, New Law on Credit Privacy, S.F. CHRON., June
30, 1994, at D1.
The credit card issuer shall provide a written notice to the cardholder that clear-
ly and conspicuously describes the cardholder's right to prohibit the disclosure
•. which discloses the cardholder's identity. The notice shall include either a
preprinted form by which the cardholder may exercise this right or shall advise
the cardholder of a toll-free telephone number which the cardholder may call
to satisfy this right.
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rate sensitive and non-sensitive information. The solution for sen-
sitive data like medical or credit card records is regulation. ' 59
It seems to me that legislative bodies may well find that certain
lists are generally used for purposes that the public doesn't wish to
permit, and therefore, should prohibit their transfer without explicit
consent by the individual consumer.6° Indeed, the Crime Control
Bill,61 which passed recently, contains a provision that makes driv-
er's license and auto registration information essentially inaccessi-
ble to individuals. 62
There is a point at which each of us, I think, really believes
that the inquisitiveness of others ought to be unlawful. In the play
A Streetcar Named Desire, Tennessee Williams' character Blanche
Dubois says in closing, "I have always depended upon the kindness
of strangers." Unfortunately, we can't be so trusting today.
PROF. REIDENBERG: Thank you, Norm. You presented
a very interesting take on commercial privacy; the notion that a
commercial transaction or the consumer's involvement ought to
stop with the one-shot transaction, the buy or the sell. Your dou-
ble-edged view of anonymity-bad on the fraud side, but necessary
on the consumer side-I think is an important insight.
The next presentation offers a look at communications on a net-
work from a very different angle: in particular, the issue is how
we protect information where it is the government that is coming
59. Waldrop, supra note 22.
60. Olgilvy and Mather recently developed a set of voluntary guidelines to encourage
responsible behavior by Internet marketers:
1. Intrusive e-mail is not welcome.
2. Internet consumer data is not for resale without express permission of the
user.
3. Advertising is allowed only in designated newsgroups and list servers.
4. Promotions and direct selling is allowed but only under full disclosure.
5. Consumer research is only allowed with the consumer's full consent.
6. Internet communications software must never hide concealed functions.
See Jane Weaver, Net Gain, INSIDE MEDIA, July 13, 1994, at 28.
61. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1776 (codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
62. But see Waldrop, supra note 22 (indicating that some press and First Amendment
scholars argue that there is a constitutional right of public access to such data).
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in and getting access as opposed to, say, marketers buying and
selling our personal information.
We will look at the question of what we can do to protect our
information when the government may want access to it, and what
we, as citizens engaged in network communications, can expect.
We will hear from Peter Drew Kennedy, who is a graduate of
the University of Chicago Law School and Southwestern Universi-
ty. He has been very active in the litigation field and in computer
communications. In particular, he was one of the attorneys in the
case of Steve Jackson Games,63 which he will be discussing today.
MR. KENNEDY: I am going to do my best to keep my re-
marks fairly short today, for two reasons. One is that the topic of
privacy is so broad, and I am going to be dealing with issues very
different from what Norm did, so I would like to save time to an-
swer questions and get into discussions, because it is interesting the
way that these issues are sort of interlocked.
Second, because the law is so poorly defined as applied to this
technology, it is difficult to say what the law is, but it is interesting
to talk about what type of situations exist and what the law might
be, or what decisions might be made depending on fact situations.
As I said this morning, my law firm and I got involved in com-
puter communication issues through the back door. We were con-
tacted to represent a small role-playing game company named Ste-
ven Jackson Games. I don't know if you folks are familiar with
the case, but they publish a series of role playing games called
"Gurps." It is a Generic Universal Role-Playing System, similar
to "Dungeons & Dragons." They published this game in book
form, usually soft-bound books, and some hard-bound books as
well.
In the late 1980s and up to 1990, as a service for their custom-
ers, they were providing electronic bulletin board systems. The
folks who play role-playing games are fairly intense and it is a
serious hobby. At Steve Jackson Games, they had a very well-
63. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
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defined set of customers and game players that had set up this
bulletin board system, but compared to the large commercial sys-
tems that we have been talking about today in the Internet and the
different levels of Internet like the World Wide Web and Usenet,
this was stone age technology. It ran on an XT computer; I think
it had a forty meg hard drive, a single telephone line, and a single
twenty-four hundred Baud modem at the time.
But in 1990 it was still fairly cutting edge to have this as a
service. The board had several different areas in it. On the day
that the Secret Service walked off with it, the board had about
three hundred and sixty-five subscribers. It had an electronic mail
system within the board so that all the subscribers could send pri-
vate electronic messages to each other, and it had a series of bulle-
tin board areas where the subscribers could leave public messages
that could be read by other subscribers to the board where they
could talk about their particular favorite role playing game.
The board also had a series of file areas, which was maintained
by the company itself, where the company posted articles about
game playing or articles of interest to game players. They also
used the bulletin board to post draft games that they were writing.
The company would post the drafts on the board and their best
customers would download them and "play test" them to decide
whether they liked the game and whether it worked well or not.
Then the subscribers would provide input back to the company:
for instance, they might say, "it would be better if these monsters
had three heads instead of two." It was typical role-playing stuff,
but it was a very valuable tool to the company to get that type of
prepublication feedback from the customer. You will see that lots
and lots of companies are doing this now, regardless of whether
they are a high-tech or low-tech industry. They will have customer
feedback through a customer support bulletin board system so that
they can provide contact with their customers.
One of the advantages to this system is that there is no real-
time connection necessary. A customer can dial up in the middle
of the night and leave a question-how do you work this software,
how do you work this toy, how do you work this game-and the
company can reply back in due time through the private electronic
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messages.
. At the same time that Steve Jackson Games was publishing
their games and running this bulletin board system, there was an
investigation bubbling in Atlanta, Georgia concerning the illegal
intrusion into a Bell South computer. Some hackers, namely teen-
aged kids in Georgia, had gained unauthorized access to a Bell
South computer and came up with a "trophy," which is essentially
what most hackers do. They nose around systems they are not
supposed to be on and they come up with a "trophy" which they
can then show to their friends. They say, "look at this computer
I got into, and this is a little trophy I got from it."
Well, the "trophy" that these teenagers came off with was a
very bureaucratic document concerning the workings of the en-
hanced 911 system. It sounds scary, it deals with the emergency
911 system, but essentially this is a document which said who in
the huge Bell hierarchy was in charge of what parts.
These hacker kids accessed the information and then stored it
on another computer. Eventually it made its way to a fellow who
published a little underground newsletter. He took this document,
edited out a lot of the sensitive information,, such as telephone
numbers and things, and then again, as a trophy, published it
through a large mailing list on the Internet as part of a newsletter.
So again, another reason to sign up for Usenet or Internet is so
that you can get these things, because it is neat stuff that gets sent
out. I subscribe to a digest called Computer Underground Digest
and it is essentially a compilation sent out two or three times a
week electronically with interesting articles that people pick up,
stick them on there, and distribute.
There was a newsletter called Phrack which dealt with topics
of interest to hackers. In one of the articles they had pared down
this Bell South document which had originated in Georgia, and sent
it out on the Internet to many people. The Bell South folks found
out about it and weren't real happy. The three kids in Georgia
eventually were indicted and pled guilty. The security folks in the
Bell System started tracking the stuff down and they went to the
Secret Service.
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The Secret Service is responsible for, among other things, pros-
ecuting fraudulent money and protective presence, and a variety of
odds and ends of law enforcement things. One of their areas of
jurisdiction is certain types of computer fraud and computer intru-
sion, which area they share with the FBI. The Secret Service is
getting involved in doing this type of prosecution. But in this case,
they were relying heavily on the private security forces of the Bell
Companies, who were essentially coming up with articles and say-
ing in effect, "Here are all the articles: go conduct a search."
Bell South had tracked one of these Phrack issues with the
edited Bell South document to Austin, Texas, which is my home
town, and they found it posted on a bulletin board system run by
a fellow out of his home.4 He had a small computer and he and
a friend ran this little bulletin board system as a hobby. Among all
of the issues of Phrack that they had available on their bulletin
board system for other people to come and download, was the issue
that contained this edited version of the Bell South document, the
"trophy."
Security officers for Bell found this bulletin board system in
Austin, Texas and they downloaded it and went to the Secret Ser-
vice and said, look, we found it, one of these guys has got this
document on this bulletin board system down in Austin, Texas.
The Secret Service was also told that this person worked for a
company called Steve Jackson Games, and that the company also
ran a bulletin board system, Illuminati.
So, the Secret Service went down to Austin, Texas and got a
search warrant and, they busted both places. They went to this
guy's house and they took his computer and they went to Steve
Jackson Games. Even though the Secret Service didn't have any
evidence that anything wrong was going on at Steve Jackson
Games, the company was nonetheless running a bulletin board
system, Illuminati. It didn't have the Phrack document on it, nor
did it have any evidence of any wrongdoing on it, nor any discus-
64. See id. A heavily-edited 911 document was available on a computer bulletin
board system, "The Phoenix Project," which was operated by Loyd Blankenship. Id. at
435.
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sions about computer hacking. The only evidence was merely the
connection between this employee and the company.
The Secret Service was unfamiliar with the technology, but
went and got a search warrant from the Magistrate and at dawn on
March 1, 1990, they were at the door of Steve Jackson Games,
ready to take essentially anything with a computer chip in it. And
they did. The Secret Service executed the search warrant and they
took the bulletin board system, which ran twenty-four hours a day
and was still up and running at the time. They took a broken com-
puter; they took a computer from the employee's desk; they took
boxes of floppy disks; and they took printed copies of a draft book.
An interesting element of this, coincidentally, is that the compa-
ny was about to publish a game book called Gurps Cyberpunk
which was a role-playing game about computer hacking. You
don't use a computer to play, instead you sit around a table with
dice and a book, and pretend you are computer hackers. There are
also a bunch of rules in the book about pretending you're a com-
puter hacker. It was a role-playing game in the cyberpunk science
fiction genre, which deals with folks who take their brains and plug
them into computers and then go "surfing." It had a bunch of
realistic sounding information about computer hacking in it, but it
wouldn't do you any good if you were trying to do any computer
hacking, unless you had a little port to jack into your head.
Nonetheless, the Secret Service got worked up about it. They
seized the book, the computer and the bulletin board system, and
the bulletin board system had the draft of this game on it because
they were soliciting comments from their users about whether or
not this would be a good game. Indeed this was a hot topic at the
time and they thought this game was going to be a big seller.
The Secret Service carted off all the stuff to their Austin office.
Steve Jackson arrived the next day and basically said, I need my
stuff back, because we need to publish this book: we are a role-
playing game company and you took all the copies of our book.
But the Secret Service would not return any of the property. They
gave him very limited access to the material and then proceeded to
ship all of it up to Chicago where the computer experts were. It
sat up in Chicago for month after month after month, and the com-
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pany went through some very serious financial times. They laid
off half their staff and had to reconstruct this book from very old
drafts so as to finally get it out and publish it. Needless to say,
they were very unhappy about what had happened at the hands of
the Secret Service.
Steve Jackson tells the story better than I do, but his favorite
part was when he went in on March 2 to the Secret Service and
asked them to give his material back. His testimony was that the
Secret Service agent had the draft of the Gurps Cyberpunk book
and told him he was publishing a "handbook for computer crime,"
and that this was the directions for how to commit computer crime.
And Steve Jackson was saying, well, no, really, this is just fiction,
and you are not going to get anywhere trying to break into a com-
puter using that book. But they saw it differently.
This incident raised a lot of questions in the computer commu-
nity and raised a lot of sympathy. Steve Jackson was able to con-
tact some civil libertarians and some very high quality civil liber-
ties lawyers in Massachusetts and, New York, and they filed a law
suit on his behalf. They then brought my firm in as local counsel
and eventually as trial counsel. The East Coast law firms stepped
out for various reasons.
The difficult thing about the case conceptually was to figure out
what laws were broken. What did the government do wrong? It
was obvious to most involved that the Secret Service had bungled
this fairly badly, had damaged a legitimate company and had in-
vaded the privacy of a number of people. But the difficult thing
conceptually is to figure out what they did wrong.
If you look at the initial complaint that was filed, it is a beauti-
ful piece of work. I didn't do it. It was done by a magnificent
lawyer, Sharon Beckman of Silvergate & Good in Boston, and it
sort of walks from the highest broadest principle down to the most
lowly simple rule of law. It starts with the First Amendment and
Fourth Amendment, works through a number of Federal statutes
and it ends up, after we got involved, considering various state
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privacy laws.65
The interesting thing about how the case worked out was a very
difficult practical matter that we ended up dealing with. One of the
reasons the case was brought was to try to establish that the consti-
tutional principles of both the Fourth Amendment, which is a pro-
tection against searches and seizures, and of the First Amendment,
the right of free speech and press, would apply in the electronic
medium in the same way that they do in the print medium and in
the broadcast medium.
One of the reasons behind bringing the case and suing the Se-
cret Service was to try to recover damages for what had happened
with the seizure. The difficult practical matter that we bumped our
head against was the doctrine of qualified immunity." If you are
all familiar with this from federal procedure or elsewhere, you, of
course, cannot sue the government for violation of your constitu-
tional rights, because they have not waived sovereign immunity.
You can't sue the United States and say, "United States, you have
violated my First Amendment right and, therefore, you owe me
money." You have to sue the individual officers involved.67 The
individual officers involved will be immune from suit unless you
can show as a plaintiff that they violated a clearly established
law.68 If you can show that they violated clearly established law,
65. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2701
(1988).
66. The basic formulation of the doctrine is that an official performing discretionary
functions has qualified immunity from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long
as his conduct conforms to a reasonableness test. Section 1983 states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
67. A state official may be deemed to have violated the Act if he knew or reasonably
should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights or
if he acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,247-48 (1974) ("It
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immu-
nity of executive officers for acts performed in the course off official conduct").
68. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (where
petitioner is granted monetary damages for injuries suffered as a result of search conduct-
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then you can sue them in civil court and recover damages and
establish a precedent.
The Catch-22 is that if you are suing to establish constitutional
law in an area where there is no clearly established law, then it is
very difficult to win the law suit, because you have to go in and
say, well, Judge, this is a new area of law and we want to establish
these First and Fourth Amendment principles and we want to
blame these officers for it. The judge then says, well, if they
were not clearly established at the time then the officers are not to
blame, and so we won't make any ruling that the law was clearly
established on March 1, 1990. So, you get stuck in a Catch-22,
and the law never gets decided. The problem with qualified immu-
nity is that you have difficulty establishing new constitutional prin-
ciples in law suits against government agents because the law never
gets decided.
When this issue was raised by the government, (unfortunately,
almost two years after the law suit was filed), we were faced with
the decision of arguing the qualified immunity point and very like-
ly losing it. Even if we were to win it, there would be a direct
appeal to the Fifth Circuit- and to United States Supreme Court
from the decision denying qualified immunity. If we won it, the
government could appeal, but if we lost it, we would be stuck until
the end of the case and then we could take it up.
We made the tactical decision of looking harder at the non-
constitutional remedies that were available, and I think very sur-
prisingly to most of the folks I counsel in this area, the law is fair-
ly well-established with respect to statutory protections that you
have as a computer user, particularly as a computer publisher, from
unwarranted invasion of privacy by the government.
I am going to touch on three of these statutory protections and
then I will sit down and hopefully we can talk a little more about
them later. The most interesting statute and most obscure one until
now is called the First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of
1980.69 This law was passed by Congress in response to an egre-
ed by federal agents which violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1988).
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gious search and seizure of the Stanford Daily's offices. The Stan-
ford Daily had covered a disturbance at the university. It was a
protest that had turned violent. They had pictures of it, and the
campus police wanted the pictures of the disturbance as evidence
in criminal prosecutions against folks who were involved in the
protest.
The police obtained a search warrant, went to the Stanford
Daily, searched their offices, and came out with pictures and evi-
dence of the crime that had allegedly taken place on campus. The
Stanford Daily, of course, had done nothing but cover the story.
They were not accused of having been involved in any criminal
activity. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, who
said that the First Amendment does not increase the standard the
government has to show to do a search and seizure; it is purely the
Fourth Amendment that applies.70 There was no violation of the
Stanford Daily's First Amendment rights, even though, of course,
as journalists they felt highly violated that their news gathering had
been compromised in order to advance a government prosecution.
So, in response, Congress passed a statute which protects pub-
lishers of information from searches and seizures if they are not the
target of the investigation.71 It is not a very well known statute, it
is not the best written statute, but it is clearly on the books. And
a publisher is exactly what Steve Jackson Games was, if you read
the statute.
Steve Jackson Games was both a publisher of books and a
publisher of information through an electronic'bulletin board sys-
tem, and, as such, the company held material that was intended to
be distributed to the public. And, pursuant to the Privacy Protec-
tion Act, publishers are protected from a search and seizure of
evidence which they are holding to publish, even if they are going
to do it for a bulletin board system.72
70. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
72. The pertinent language in the Privacy Protection Act states that:
Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a government officer or
employee, in connection with the investigation ... of a criminal offense, to
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And so we were able to establish the precedent-and although
Judge Sparks, the trial judge, skirted the issue a bit, I think the
implications of his opinion are fairly clear-that as an electronic
bulletin board operator, if you are holding material on your com-
puter that you are intending to publish and distribute to the public,
then you are protected from a search and seizure by the govern-
ment unless you are the subject of the criminal investigation. 3 The
government conceded that Steve Jackson Games was not the sub-
ject of a criminal investigation, that only an employee of theirs
was, and that since there was no evidence of any criminal activity
in their offices, they were protected by the Privacy Protection Act.
The government, therefore, was liable for the damages that they
had done in seizing the computers and the drafts of the book.74
The second half of the case dealt with the protection of the
private electronic communications on the board. We had to recon-
struct the evidence through the computer files that had been re-
turned by the Secret Service, but at the time that the Secret Service
seized the Bulletin Board system, there were something like one
hundred and fifty electronic mail messages on the board. Of
course this is a small bulletin board system, but that sounds like a
lot.
The Secret Service took it to Chicago and started the bulletin
board system again. In Chicago, someone read all the electronic
mall, A to Z, and then deleted it. It was all thrown out. The fasci-
nating evidentiary question to work on was to get all the files to-
gether, so we brought in the person who wrote the software, Wayne
Bell, and he made the determination that indeed that's what was
done.
None of the users on the Board were suspects in the criminal
investigation, with the exception of the one fellow who was an
search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably
believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (1988).
73. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432,
440-43 (W.D. Tex. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
74. 816 F. Supp. at 441.
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employee and ran a bulletin board out of his home. So, all of the
users, except this one, had their private electronic mail read, ana-
lyzed and thrown out by the government without any probable
cause that they had been involved in any violation of any law at
all.
Most of the mail dealt with role-playing games and other such
stuff. However, there were people who had struck up friendships
because of their association and were exchanging private mail, and
talking about private things. We had three of these users involved
as plaintiffs in the law suits, and each indicated they had used this
to send private communications and were highly offended by what
the government did with their mail.75
.The equivalent would be if they had gone into Steve Jackson
games and found a stack of private mail that was sealed in an in
box and said, "these are a hundred of Steve Jackson's customers,
I wonder what they are saying to one another, let's read it and if
it is not'interesting, let's throw it out."
There is a federal statute which prohibits the government from
doing this sort of thing.76 And it is encouraging that it has been
construed to apply to this situation, because I am not entirely sure
it was written for me.
In 1986, in an effort to catch up with some of the technology
the Federal government passed what is known as the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act. 7 The Act added a new section to
Title Eighteen, and it amended the Wiretap Act.78 The section the
Act added to Title 18 is called the "stored access" or "access to
stored computer communications," and it essentially sets the bound-
aries for when computer operators can access electronic communi-
cations, when they can pass such communications to other people,
75. Id. at 439 ("Elizabeth McCoy, Walter Milliken and Steffan O'Sullivan also allege
compensatory damages. These plaintiffs all had stored electronic communications, or E-
mail, on the Illuminati bulletin board at the time of seizure. All three of these Plaintiffs
testified that they had public and private communications in storage at the time of the
seizure").
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2711 (1988).
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
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and it set standards for government access to the electronic com-
munications.79
The Secret Service frankly admitted they really didn't know
about this statute and therefore had not attempted to stay within its
guidelines. Additionally, the Secret Service and their lawyer ad-
mitted that they had never heard of the Privacy Protection Act of
1980. Didn't know about it, didn't know they weren't allowed to
kick open the doors in these rooms.
And I said, well, if it had been my client, the Austin American
Statesmen, which is a local daily in Austin, would you have done
the same? And they said, yes, would have done the same. Which
is a real frightening thing to hear from someone packing an Uzi
while you are taking a deposition.
The third issue which we lost at the trial court and took up to
the Fifth Circuit, was a twist on the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act argument. The standard paradigm for electronic com-
munication was e-mail. It is different than a phone call, in at least
one way: it is not a real-time communication. You draft your
electronic message, your e-mail, and send it to the attendant recipi-
ent. Even on the most simple system, like Steve Jackson Games,
that mail will remain resident on the hard drive for a period of time
before the person you send it to reads it.
I write an electronic mail message, containing something pri-
vate, to a person. It is transmitted and it will be stored, at least
temporarily, on a hard drive somewhere before the person to whom
I have addressed it will have a chance to read it. It seemed that
there were a number of messages like that on the board when Steve
Jackson's machine was seized. A lot of those messages were read
and deleted as well. They were essentially en route to their desti-
nation.
The parties in the case felt these communications were especial-
ly sensitive. The person who had written the piece of mail no
longer had control over it. The person to whom it was addressed
couldn't access it yet, hadn't yet gotten a hold of the communica-
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1988).
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tion, but there it sat in a vulnerable state. And it was exactly at
that point when the government stepped in and walked off with the
messages.
We argued the seizure was an interception of an electronic
communication, that it was essentially the same as a wiretap, be-
cause the government was placing themselves between the point of
transmission and receipt of the message. The wiretap act was
amended by the ECPA in 1986 to include electronic communica-
tions. 80 Therefore, the government must follow the procedures
necessary to wire tap a phone before it can intercept electronic
communications such as computer communications.
In the situation of en route e-mail, we felt it was being inter-
cepted in the same way a wiretap would have if they had tapped in
and captured the data.
We lost this argument in front of Judge Sparks, and you can
read the opinion for his justification.8" However, we won the other
issues. Judge Sparks felt that the Privacy Protection Act had been
violated and that the government had violated the historic Commu-
nications Act.8 2 The court awarded the company considerable dam-
ages for the loss experienced, and statutory damages for the viola-
tion of the individuals' e-mail.
We took the interception issue to the Fifth Circuit and we lost
again.83 The Fifth Circuit said there is a difference: the Wiretap
Act deals with contemporaneous seizures of transmissions and
information as they pass through the wire, and the stored communi-
cation provision deals with e-mail that is sitting on a hard drive,
regardless of whether it has been received or not.84
I am not sure the Fifth Circuit is correct, and the government's
position is defensible that the two acts treat the two things differ-
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
81. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432,
442 (W.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
82. 816 F. Supp. at 441.
83. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.
1994).
84. Id. at 461-62.
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ently. If you ever try to read through the ECPA, you can see that
it will support any number of different interpretations.
But it was an interesting and difficult issue to determine how
these laws were going to deal with a very particularized fact situa-
tion where the technology falls somewhere in between what the
two statutes seem to contemplate.
Well, I can beat a dead horse on this case all day, but I would
welcome your questions on it, and I am going to just pass it on to
the next panel member.
PROF. REIDENBERG: The case raises a very interesting jux-
taposition. The privacy interests you were talking about, those of
the company and those of the subscribers, versus the access to the
information stored on the computer. And the purpose of the case
was really to stake out the protection of content and the privacy
of that. Unlike the consumer side, in this area, as against the gov-
ernment, you described a situation where there are some protections
that are available.
Next, we are going to hear from Ronald Abramson. He will
speak about a self-help mechanism, cryptography, and its role in
the privacy debate.
Mr. Abramson is a graduate of Rutgers Law School and M.I.T.
He has been very active in computer law and presently chairs the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Computer Law.
MR. ABRAMSON: My remarks are not going to be nearly as
extensive as the other two speakers.
First of all, I would like to just make a few comments, after
having listened to the other presentations. I guess the main one is
that when discussing the Internet we have to, at least in my view,
recognize what makes the Internet so interesting. Would this fo-
rum be as interesting as it is if all we had to talk about was Ameri-
ca Online, CompuServe, Prodigy and Delphi? I don't really think
SO.
I think what makes this all so exciting is the fact that the
Internet, first of all, is kind of spontaneous. It is something that
developed out of military work, research grants and an academic
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environment. So, it was there and it was essentially being subsi-
dized while these phenomenal communication links were being set
up, not just in the United States but worldwide.
Since no commercial interest was involved, nobody had planned
this out in terms of whether they were going to make money. This
was being done as a convenience to people who were doing re-
search. It turned out they had a lot more capacity than needed, and
it was realized that the Internet could be useful for a whole lot of
other things.
The other thing that makes it interesting is the lack of regula-
tion for the Internet. There really is no way to regulate it. I ha-
ven't heard the word international yet, but that is what we are talk-
ing about. The Internet doesn't have borders.
How many of you use the Internet? [A show of hands.] A
pretty good percentage. I see also there are a number that don't.
When you get on the Internet and start sending messages, you
realize that you don't know where these messages are going, you
don't know what country the messages are going to. It is not un-
common to get on the service and see that some of the messages
are in German, and some are in French. And chances are the peo-
ple who typed all this German and French into the computer
weren't sitting in New Jersey. They were probably sitting in Eu-
rope. I have even seen Japanese characters actually on the screen.
And these messages just bounce around on the Internet without
regard to physical borders, which gives rise to some interesting
phenomena.
For instance, if you take the situation where somebody wants
to disguise their identity, either for good purposes or for bad; there
are a number of ways you can accomplish that. One easy way is
just to use a false identity when you sign up for a service provider.
Another way to conceal your identity is to use what is called an
anonymous remailer, which is a service that allows you to send an
electronic mail message repackaged under the remailer's own head-
er, stripping off yours completely. When that message shows up,
as far as I know, there is no way to know where it came from.
If you use an anonymous remailer inside of the United States,
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the information can be obtained through a subpoena. However, if
you go ahead and use an anonymous remailer in Finland, recovery
may not be as practical. I haven't researched what is involved in
trying to use the treaties to execute a warrant in Finland, but I bet
it is pretty difficult. That is probably why the anonymous remailer
in Finland is so popular.
Realistically, there is no way to control this stuff, and this is a
fact of life. So, to the extent that laws are passed in the United
States, to a great degree those laws would be ineffectual in dealing
with a lot of these phenomena.
As I mentioned, the other thing that has complicated matters is
the lack of regulation. People don't want paternalistic services by
and large. A lot of people feel comfortable with a protected envi-
ronment such as America Online. However, a lot of people disavow
that. They don't want a protected environment. They want an
Internet provider where you don't sign an agreement.
There are a lot of Internet providers who do not require you to
sign a written agreement. In fact, I know of an Internet provider
that doesn't even send you a bill. You send it money. If they
don't get your check payment, they simply turn off your account.
There is no written agreement, there is no billing, there is no paper
trail at all. They don't have the ability, because they are not set up
to do it. It is possible that they collect information on people,
maybe they log every transaction that you do. They never signed
anything saying they don't. However, they also never signed any-
thing exonerating themselves for such acts. Therefore, I doubt that
they would engage in such behavior, because they would be expos-
ing themselves to some considerable liability, absent a disclaimer.
But the fact is that this is a very prevalent type of service. I
would suggest that, to some extent, if the system is going to thrive
and fulfill its potential,, it has to be left free in many of these re-
gards. If you step in and regulate this thing, it is just going to
wither and die or it is going to sprout up in some other way. Peo-
ple will find some other way to interact with it, where they are not
regulated, because part of the attractiveness of the Internet is the
freedom and the lack of regulation, and the fact that it is interna-
tional.
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In order to be responsive to Professor Reidenberg on the issue
of cryptography, this is another issue where it is very easy to con-
fuse the national and the international. I would suggest that we
focus on the national and forget about the fact that there is a world
out there.
One of the big issues in cryptography is the issue of export
controls. Our committee just ran a seminar, a program at the City
Bar, on the Clipper Chip. There is'a transcript of that program that
is available. It is quite interesting. The transcript is on the
Internet, and if anybody is interested, I can give them the address
where they can get the transcript electronically.
We had a very high level of debate. The panel consisted of
people from the FBIformer general counsel of the National Secu-
rity agency, an individual from the White House and the Director
of Security at IBM, who presented a very broad and diverse view
of the Clipper Chip and cryptography issues.
A very strong level of cryptography is available right now for
free. It is called PGP, and it has a curious legal status. PGP is a
system written by an individual named Phil Zimmerman, which
combines public key cryptography 5 and conventional cryptogra-
phy. 86 It uses public key cryptography, thus enabling a two-part
key where you can distribute one key publicly and keep the other
private.
85. See Ira S. Rubenstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, 705 PLI/COMM
177, § 2(b) (1994):
In the mid-1970s, two Stanford University scientists (Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman) [invented] a new approach to cryptography known as public-
key encryption. Diffie and Hellman developed a system with two mathemati-
cally related keys. Although the keys form a matched pair, it is
computationally infeasible to derive one key from the other. Therefore, the
system allows users to openly publish one key in a phone-book like directory
(the "public key"), while keeping the other key private (the "private key").
Because the keys are mathematically related a message encrypted with one key
can be decrypted by the other (and vice versa). In other words, each key is the
inverse function of the other; what one does, the other can undo.
Id.
86. Cryptography generally is the process by which data is scrambled into an unread-
able language in order to hide its content from everyone except its intended recipient. See
id. at §§ 1-2.
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I am not going to go into the details of export controls and
cryptography, because I think enough has been written. 7 Public
key cryptography is very computer-intensive, relying heavily upon
the computer CPU for processing. Instead of encrypting the entire
message with the public key, you use the public key to encrypt a
conventional key which is generated transparently on the fly.
The software creates a conventional key and encrypts the mes-
sage, then it encrypts the conventional key with the public key and
sends the message out. At the other end of the transmission the
person who has the private key decrypts the internal conventional
key-I don't know if you are following this. There are two levels
of encryption and the important part is that it uses the conventional
cryptography for what it is good for, which is being very strong
and efficient, while it uses the public key cryptography for what it
is good for, which is providing the possibility of a two-way com-
munication where you can distribute keys without having to worry
about security.
The software works very well, and it is available on a number
of platforms, PCs, Unix systems and Macs. You can download it
for free. It is covered by patents, primarily the "RSA" patent, now
held by Public Key Partners, the company that holds the patents on
most public key cryptography right now. They have allowed this
software to be used under license for noncommercial purposes.
And, in fact, MIT took over the distribution and the authoritative
version is available on an FTP server at MIT.
So, inside of the United States you can get this with the restric-
tion that you not use it for commercial purposes. And if you want
to use it for commercial purposes, there is a company called
ViaCrypt, which has a license which they got a long time ago from
RSA. ViaCrypt provides a license for $100 which allows you to
use PGP commercially without concern about the RSA patents.
87. See Kenneth J. Pierce, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First
Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197 (1994); Charles L.
Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts to Protect Nation-
al Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets,
19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM REG. 469 (1994).
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Since your license and these patents only exist in the United States
and Canada, you are pretty well covered.
The only hitch is export controls. You are not allowed to ex-
port this technology out of the United States, which a lot of people
consider to be a joke because anybody on the Internet can and does
download this information. In fact, versions of this software were
first released overseas.
One wonders how much sense this makes. Even during the
cold war, people always wondered about export controls, whether
they were effective or whether they were just crippling our indus-
try. But one really wonders about it now, in an age where the cold
war is over, particularly with regard to cryptography where the
information is so obviously available all over the world. The opin-
ion of many people is that the attempt to control exports accom-
plishes nothing against criminals and terrorists.
But certainly this is a tool that if you are interested in keeping
your communications private, is legally available and used by a lot
of people. It is a self-help security measure.
There are plenty of other self-help measures you can take.
When Professor Silber talks about the junk mail, one of the things
that people do is to throw it out. Or you can take measures like
getting yourself off of lists. To take an example that is close to
home, in my apartment building, we have two banks of mailboxes.
In the middle there is a bulletin board and underneath that bulletin
board there is a slot leading to a garbage pail. Literally, you go
through your mail, take everything that looks like junk mail, and
stick it in the slot. You don't have to worry about dragging it
upstairs or filling up your own garbage pail. Therefore, I don't
take much offense to junk mail, because I just throw it out. You
are pretty close to the source. Additionally, when I sign off for
things, if there is a space to opt out of having my name put on a
mailing list, or having that mailing list sold, I check it. Basically
I feel that a lot of these problems can take care of themselves.
The problem I feel won't take care of itself is the situation
where your information is involuntarily collected from you, and
then that information is disseminated in ways over which you have
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no control. These are the examples that were given before: the
motor vehicle registry, the application for insurance, the application
for a driver's license, your use of a credit card. These are things
that you really have to do every day and, by and large, you have
to use your real identity, unless you want to start leading multiple
existences, which I think would get a little Weird.
This represents an area where you can't really help yourself.
You are at the mercy of the companies that are compiling this
information, not only for purposes of sending you junk mail, which
I think is fairly benign, but for other purposes. These other pur-
poses include discrimination relating to employment, relating to
insurance and so forth. I think substantial possibilities exist for
this information to be misused.
The time is becoming ripe to really think about controlling how
that information gets compiled and how that information gets used
after it has been compiled. I think there are some really difficult
problems of identification and definition here. You also have to be
careful that any regime you establish does not start to restrict com-
munications and itself become a burden on free communication.
But that is an area where I think that reform measures are real-
ly needed. I think that a lot should be done in terms of trying to
define what the dangers are, what the abuses are and how we could
specify laws that could control such dangers and abuses. Without
reform, everybody's personal lives will be more and more laid bare
and be available for abuse. That is an area of great concern.
PROF. REIDENBERG: I would like now to open the floor to
questions and then see where the discussion leads. I will exercise
the moderator's prerogative and start.
Several people on the panel have mentioned the need for con-
sumer reform. Can the Panel address what law presently exists and
what proposals are being developed to protect consumers and their
information?
PROF. SILBER: I think California has taken a number of
measures, and I think it is the leader at this point in creating an
opt-out right with respect to credit card information. I also think
I referred in my presentation to the Crime Bill, which has made
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inaccessible certain driver's license information. So, there has been
some work in this area.
I would like to respond to Ron's arguments against regulation.
I am always a little bit skeptical when one argues against regula-
tion based on its supposed futility. It is one thing to talk about the
desirability of regulation as a matter of policy, but I question the
historical argument that the world is too big, or that these people
are too clever to be regulated; that we have anonymous mailboxes
and we can't get to them, or we have to serve people in places like
Finland. I concede that the problems are considerable, but I deny
that they are insurmountable. As a way of illustrating what can be
done if the will is there, I would point you to Article 4A of the
Uniform Commercial Code,88 which concerns wire transfers, espe-
cially commercial electronic wire transfers of.large amounts of
money. Every day literally trillions of dollars of money is trans-
ferred from one country to another, not just to Finland but all over
the world. And that is done, for the most part, securely and pri-
vately. It is done because of laws which are intricately designed
to be state law, federal law, and, to some degree, international law.
Almost everybody likes anarchy until he or she is the victim of
lawlessness. Fundamentally the issue becomes whether it is worth
doing, not whether it is or is not futile. I am not suggesting that
the task is easy. But I don't think that it does very much good for
us to think about the problem as futile. I would suggest that we
have a debate over concrete steps.
MR. ABRAMSON: Well, I don't want to dodge the question
that has been asked and I think you raised some good points.
With respect to the issue you call "anarchy," I think that if you
look at our legal history, a kind of laissez-faire approach pervades
it in a lot of respects. If you look back at the 19th Century in
terms of the laws that were passed as far as eminent domain and
so forth, they are really set up to shield people from liability. And
basically the reason was to let these industries grow, because this
was perceived as a good thing.
88. U.C.C. ch. 4A (1989).
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I think there is a historical basis for that and I think it is a
legitimate point of view. By the same reasoning, you could argue
that when discussing companies like America Online or Delphi,
with all the exculpatory language in their subscriber agreement,
maybe there is some value to having our legal system recognize
that it really doesn't do any good to take somebody Who is just
serving as a carrier of information, as a medium, and make them
liable for what boneheads happen to post on their system.
I don't see the social utility that is served by making Prodigy
liable when some idiot happens to post a message saying that
somebody who runs a mutual fund is irresponsible, which is some-
thing actually going on right now.89
I don't see the usefulness of having that level of regulation. In
fact, I think it might be better to have a carefully crafted law that
says Prodigy and other servers are immune from that kind of liabil-
ity. Because Prodigy is not the real wrongdoer, and by assigning
liability to Prodigy you are going to force them to start censoring.
I think that would lead the law in a direction that a lot of people
would rather not see it go.
MR. KENNEDY: I think we are dealing with two very distinct
problems that Professor Silber raised. One is an area fairly subject
to regulation and control, which is the collection by a service pro-
vider of personal information about the user when they sign up. In
that situation you can identify who is responsible. The party gain-
ing the information is an actor that you can say is responsible for
its use of the information.
On the other hand, you are dealing with content regulations,
trying to protect consumers from fraudulent transactions or fraudu-
lent advertisements being sent through computer systems. The
control of that is far more difficult and fraught with dangers to the
service providers and to First Amendment values generally, because
you are trying to control or hold people liable for the content of
material they did not generate.
89. See discussion infra Panel I (remarks of Jacob Zamansky concerning the Stratton-
Oakmont case).
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The regulation of the collection and use of private information
seems to be an area more susceptible to successful regulation. I
have been "Internet-challenged" until fairly recently, and I think it
is an observation from myself and from others that the optimism
about the ability to successfully regulate the Internet is inversely
proportionate to your contact with it. Folks who are most hopeful
about regulating the Internet really haven't been on it, and the folks
who have been on it for a while just kind of throw up their hands
and say we are going to put a cap back on this Genie's bottle and
get it back in.
The danger associated with collecting private information seems
a ripe issue. In my experience in this area, there has not been a
whole lot of attention directed to it, because the ability to collect
that type of information through computers is staggering, especially
by these computer services. They really have the ability of keeping
track of all the purchases you make on the bulletin board. And
with computer programs, they can sort information by type, taste,
frequency and amount, as well as various other categories.
The need or the desire to control the use of that information is
very valuable for the companies collecting it, and therefore it is an
issue that really does need to be addressed more than it has been.
It seems, up until now, that any abuse in this area has been worked
out through informal pressure asserted on the commercial bulletin
board systems by users when they found it out. For example, I
think CompuServe has significantly changed over the last few years
with respect to the way it uses that type of information and the
amount of disclosure.
Another consideration is the very intense degree of competition
among the commercial providers. I wouldn't want to under-empha-
size the value of that competition in holding down the improper
use of collected information. There is huge pressure and competi-
tion among these service providers for customers. I have bounced
back and forth among commercial providers very quickly and it is
not that hard to decide that if I don't like Prodigy, I can go to
CompuServe, who don't regulate, and it will take me twenty min-
utes to change my account.
PROF. REIDENBERG: That may work for content, but for the
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circulation of the personal information, it really doesn't work. I
may have a contract with a service provider that sets out terms for
what they collect. That is well and good, but if I use that service
provider to access any other Internet services, by necessity informa-
tion about me has to get passed on to any node that my communi-
cation crosses through on the Internet. So, any node that I go
through in getting to my Internet destination is now gaining a tre-
mendous amount of transaction information about me.
The nodes may get my identity, they may collect information
about the service I accessed, what I looked at, how long I was con-
nected. All of those different pieces of address information and
usage information are now going to be in various switches along
the way.
It is sort of like the "Ernestine" sketches by Lilly Tomlin. The
switch has the information: I am coming from Point A and I am
going to Point B, and these are the key strokes that I am entering
while I am doing it. The system can store it, whether it is actually
being done or not, will depend on the network node.
Most people are probably unaware that all of their phone calls
are profiled and, thus, in a sense monitored by the phone company.
The original draft of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
would have restricted the phone companies from allowing transac-
tion information to be disclosed, either to the government or to the
private sector. The final version kept the restraints on the govern-
ment, so if the government wants to know who you called, how
long you were on the phone, they need to get a warrant.
On the other hand, it is perfectly legal for the phone company
to disclose all your calling patterns to anyone else. The telephone
company cannot disclose the contents of what you have said, but
they can disclose who you called, when you called them, or any-
thing else like that.
If you have ever dialed an 800 number and received one of the
push button menus for various services or information, the call is
not anonymous; they are getting your identity when you make that
800 call. Most of those systems will track what services you se-
lect. There is a whole audit trail.
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There is really very little regulation in this area. There are
some rules at the state level on Caller ID, and the requirements for
allowing call blocking and call-screening features. There has been
some Federal legislation proposed to restrict marketing uses of
information collected through interactive communications. There
are one or two state laws that impose limitations. But there is
really very little in the United States.
To underscore, at least part of Ron's point, this is a. global
phenomenon. However, I would disagree with-Ron in his comment
that regulation would simply fetter the development of the global
information infrastructure or the NII, depending on which way you
want to look at it. In fact, I would say precisely the opposite.
Unless we start dealing with some kind of regulation on the fair
uses of information on network systems, there will be a lack of
development, because both business and citizens are not going to
have confidence. 9°
.There is, at least in the United States, some recent polling data,
coming out of the Harris organization, that supports this proposi-
tion. But I think more importantly, in foreign countries, they are
addressing the privacy issue through very comprehensive legislation
that will block data flows to the United States if we do not achieve
something similar.
PROF. SILBER: Let me wind down this discussion of our
future electronic consumer problems on a lighter note: there is an
AT&T ad that many of you may have seen. It begins by inquiring,
"Have you ever paid a toll without slowing down?" You see the
car going through the toll booth, and there is a voice-over that
says, you will, And then have you ever opened a door with your
voice? And there is a voice that says: "You will."
Shortly afterwards, on the Internet there was a list which paro-
died that commercial. Some of the line substitutes were: "Have
you ever been pulled over by the highway patrol because the elec-
tronic toll booth checked your vehicle ID against a nationwide list
90. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Priva-
cy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (1995).
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of parking tickets?" "You will." "Have you ever been locked out
of your apartment because you had laryngitis?" "You will."
"Have you ever received a phone call from your health insurance
company telling you that they are cancelling your coverage because
a scan of your supermarket buying patterns showed that you ate too
much beef?" "You will."
There is an interesting problem here for consumers. The prob-
lem, as Professor Reidenberg says, is that the question of privacy
cuts two different ways. On one hand we consumers value our
privacy for a personal conversation. On the other hand, when there
is too much privacy, then we consumers are victims ourselves of
the fact that nobody is monitoring what is going on.
There is considerable tension here. The tension hasn't been
resolved adequately. There is in fact a spectrum of privacy inter-
ests and it is not a matter that we can afford to be absolutist about
if we are going to try and develop the right kind of regulatory mix.
QUESTION: If we are trying to set up a regulatory framework,
given the invention of Caller ID, is there the technology to do this
type of thing on the Internet, set up some kind of privacy detec-
tion? Because NYNEX just found out that a few hundred thousand
people that opted for Caller ID blocking weren't getting it. So, is
there some kind of way we can do this technologically to set up
some systems that would protect privacy within the Information
Superhighway, or are there going to be glitches in the system con-
stantly, is it going to bypass, or is there some way to get around
the problem?
PROF. REIDENBERG: Technological solutions may establish
some privacy, but glitches will certainly be likely. What level of
glitches in the system one is willing to accept is obviously critical.
At least in NYNEX's situation, NYNEX was advised of the prob-
lems, but did nothing for a significant period of time. When
NYNEX went to the New York State Public Utilities Commission
to get authorization in order to be able to provide the Caller ID
service, they were only going to propose, I believe it was per-call
blocking. Per-call blocking would require dialing a three-digit code
and then that particular call will not identify you. Instead, New
York required NYNEX to offer customers per-line blocking, which
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meant, if you were a subscriber, you could have NYNEX block
identification for every outgoing call.
The PUC required NYNEX to offer per-line blocking as a con-
dition of being permitted to offer the service. So NYNEX then
went out and, of course, charged fees for the service. NYNEX was
later advised that, in fact, it had not implemented per-line blocking
on a significant percentage of their lines.
One of the NYNEX statements at the time was that if NYNEX
had to offer per-line blocking, the service would not be viable be-
cause too many people would not want to be identified. Well, if
that is true, that tells you something about how people value their
privacy and suggest something very important about whether it is
appropriate or not to offer per-line blocking.
Whether it was a glitch, an intentional act, or intentional negli-
gence on NYNEX's part will probably be determined both by the
PUC and by some courts resolving contract claims that are brought
against the company.
In terms of technical capability on the Internet, you could struc-
ture systems to have an equivalent pro-privacy capability. For in-
stance, as Mr. Abramson pointed out, when sending e-mail you
may strip your identity by using an anonymous remailer. That is
the equivalent of call blocking on Caller ID.
Similarly, with video dial tone or the cable service, you can
structure the network so that if marketing information is stripped
of your name. The system may capture the date and may aggre-
gate data, but not specific data. There are all sorts of ways to do
it.
MR. ABRAMSON: With respect to the other half of the ques-
tion, you are asking four lawyers, rather than four technicians,
about what can be done. And we are way behind the curve figur-
ing out. And my experience is that almost anything can be done
by these guys who "twig" with the computers. It is just absolutely
amazing ability. We, as lawyers, respond to the technology once
it is created. It is the technicians who actually develop these new
"playing fields." Once the new "fields" exist, the issue then be-
comes, what we can do about them.
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MR. KENNEDY: That actually is a point I wanted to make
about fraud, because both of you have suggested that with respect
to fraud we are in a different area than we are with respect to mar-
keting. My argument would be that we need to think about how
we can provide incentives to diminish the amount of fraud on the
Internet.
MR. ABRAMSON: I think marketing has been taken down to
a very low level in this country. My own feeling is that the Feder-
al Trade Commission just dropped the ball during the 1980s, and
you started to get this proliferation of absolute frauds, such as the
junk about contests you get in the mail.
If you go ahead and play these things, you will see that a lot of
them are frauds. These operators move from state to state because
they usually attract the attention of the attorney general in one
state. They simply wait until it has gotten too hot in Oregon, and
move over to Idaho and then they move from Idaho to Nevada.
Nevada is a pretty good place-you can get away- with a lot in
Nevada.
There is not that much enforcement at the Federal level in
terms of what is deceptive and what is not. I think people have to
come to accept that and people who are halfway intelligent now
realize the stuff that you get in your mailbox cannot be relied upon.
Certainly, other examples exist. For instance, whenever you hear
an ad on TV, there is the small print on the bottom, which you
cannot read. Or you hear an ad on the radio and again somebody
starts jabbering at about 400 words a minute, and you can't under-
stand any of that for about three seconds. All these disclaimers are
usually just enough to tell you, hey, there is a catch to this, don't
take it seriously.
So, I think it is possible to get overly concerned about some of
this. There are some legitimate areas of concern, where, for better
or worse, people will have to look out for themselves.
PROF. SILBER: I have a prediction to make. At some level,
fairly soon, some state court judge is going to declare one of those
adhesive contract provisions in one of the service provider agree-
ments unenforceable, because it is unconscionable or overbroad or
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for some good other reason. And at that point there will be some
serious consideration given by the service providers to formulating
standardized loss allocation rules that are more equitable. And then
we may just discover a more effective way of dealing with fraud
on the Internet.
QUESTION: I have a question for Mr. Kennedy. You men-
tioned the case you worked on concerning the prohibitions on read-
ing e-mail, and you used the analogy of opening a sealed envelope.
I work in higher education and we are working on problems with
the systems operating in universities and colleges with e-mail,
when employees have quit or mail has been misdirected. I have
heard people say that e-mail is not sealed. Is there any law?
MR. KENNEDY: That is a question much easier asked then
answered, unfortunately. I have spent a good bit of time talking
with people like yourself, who are involved with providing commu-
nication systems. The confusion is attributed to how poorly written
the stattite is. Ed Cavazos, who has written the most recent book
about cyberspace and the law,9' is a friend of mine in Texas, and
his opinion is that the ECPA prohibits service providers from read-
ing electronic mail that pass through the machine except in particu-
lar circumstances.92
Jonathan Wallace, who wrote the earlier book on the same top-
ic, 93 has a diametrically-opposed position. He thinks there is an
exception in the ECPA which allows service providers to read
electronic mail, but not to disclose to anyone. Wallace believes
that they have an exception where they can monitor the mail and
pass it through. I side with Ed, and I have written a few articles
saying that the better practice for people who provide these servic-
es, is not to read electronic mail, except in particular circumstanc-
es.94 One of the circumstances being to read enough of the mail to
know what to do with it in your type of situation.
So, if you have someone who has left and no longer has the
91. EDWARD CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW (1994).
92. Id. at 20-26.
93. JONATHAN WALLACE & REESE MORRISON, SYsLAW (lst ed. 1988).
94. Id. at 30-34.
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account, you can read enough in the mail to forward it, for exam-
ple. You can always read enough of a message to forward it to the
next address or to figure out what to do with the mail.
Usually, if you are in that situation, you can do things that
make sense. We use the "grandmother rule" a lot in Texas: if you
can explain it to your grandmother with a straight face as to why
you did it, and you think she will buy it without looking at you and
saying, "Now, son," then you are probably on fairly safe ground.
Ed's book is called Cyberspace and the Law. It is published
by MIT press. Prof. Reidenberg ECPA is a pretty tricky statute
and it makes distinctions here. Specifically, there are distinctions
about whether the message is internal to the system or whether it
is going out to another system. Also the exceptions are written in
a way such that I don't know if anybody really understands the
scope. One of the exceptions, as I recall, is that the operators are
allowed to go into these messages if it is necessary to protect the
system. I think that is a hard standard to interpret.
The other side is a practical matter. When you send an elec-
tronic mail message, if you address that message incorrectly, then
it is going to end up in some place where you never intended it to
end up, and that's pretty easy to do. No one has committed any
wrongdoing but the security of your message is totally compro-
mised.
The situation is also complicated by the fact that ECPA is not
the only applicable law. Most states have wiretap statutes, and a
number of the states have wiretap statutes that require what is
called "two party consent," which is both parties to the communi-
cation have to consent for disclosure to a third party. In that in-
stance, the sender as well as the university employee would both
have to consent to the university's reading of the message, if the
university is treated as a third party.
There have been a couple of state court cases where the em-
ployer has been allowed to read the e-mail messages without liabil-
ity.
9 5
95. See Scott Dean, E-Mail Forces Companies to Grapple With Privacy Issues, CORP.
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There is also an organization in Washington now called the
Electronic Messaging Association that did a study of electronic
privacy going back about three, perhaps four years ago written by
David Johnson and John Podesta. % David Johnson was a lawyer
in Washington, presently the CEO of Lexis Counsel Connect. John
Podesta is one of the key staffers in the drafting of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and is presently the staff secretary at
the White House.
They looked at this question as to what employer policies ought
to do in light of both ambiguities and difficulties in applying the
ECPA, particularly where the ECPA, as Ron just said, is going to
depend on the circumstances. If the e-mail message is coming
from a public carrier, that has one set of implications. If the mes-
sage was strictly internal to the school's LAN and it was never
passed by a public communication service, then it may be treated
quite differently.
QUESTION: The 1986 statute does outlaw the reading of elec-
tronic mail. The problem is not enforceable in the Internet.
PROF. REIDENBERG: The question is whether the ECPA autho-
rizes the employer to read any employee's e-mail?
I think that is still a very open question because many employ-
ers do not explicitly require that every use of the employer's com-
puter system be for work. For example, I know one of the major
banks in New York has a global telecommunications network and
they made it an expressed policy decision not to restrict the use of
that network to business-related purposes, because one of the things
they wanted to engender was a sense of community among the
different offices all over the world.
One of the striking things for them was the volume of messages
that were not business related between employees in their various
branch offices all around the world. I think there have certainly
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1993, at 11; Electronic Mail Raises Issues About Privacy, DAILY
LAB. REP., (BNA) No. 222, at A-7 (Nov. 17, 1992). A California court rejected a privacy
claim in Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. YC-003979, slip op. (D.C. Cal. 1993).
96. DAVID JOHNSON & JOHN PODESTA, ACCESS TO AND USE AND DISCLOSURE OF
ELECTRONIC MAIL ON COMPANY COMPUTER SYSTEMS, (EMA: 1991).
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been some courts that have taken the position that the employer
can read anything. However, those were state courts, and it is not
at all clear that that is going to be a widely held view under the
ECPA, and it would also depend on the circumstances.
Again, it is a very narrowly drawn statute with respect to appli-
cation and given the multiplicity of contexts, it is very difficult to
say generically this is what would happen in a given case.
MR. ABRAMSON: A lot of attorneys routinely advise their
clients now that they should have the employees actually sign
waivers of confidentiality as far as the company's e-mail system is
concerned, and I don't know what you may think of that, but under
the current regime it is probably advisable for an employer. I think
you will see more and more of that being done as people think
about the problem. It is just another area where privacy concerns
come up.
MR. REIDENBERG: Perhaps a final word to close. The
ECPA has an interesting provision, which I think should terrify us
as lawyers. The provision says that the system administration, for
systems administration purposes, can essentially do anything. It is
perfectly legitimate for a systems administrator to read all e-mail
messages for those purposes. The reason I think that should terrify
us as lawyers is that instead of setting up the lawyers as king, it
sets up the SYS-OPs as king on the information highways.
Well, thank you all very much.
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